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The Return of “Englishness” in British Political Culture – the End of the Unions? 
 
Abstract 
This paper approaches the interpretation of elite and popular attitudes towards the UK’s 
membership of the EU through an analysis of some of the rival perspectives on the national 
identity of the English that have become increasingly salient during the last two decades. It 
highlights their role as sources of some of the most influential ideas about nationhood, 
governance and state now shaping public discourse on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union. These include radical-democratic, restorationist, and Anglo-British forms of patriotic 
discouse, which have prompted and responded to the growing prevalence of England as ‘an 
imagined community’, a trend which has rendered other circles of attachment – to the UK 
and Europe – more tenuous and distant. A central conclusion of the paper is that these 
emerging perspectives have spawned webs of belief which connect new and old ideas of 
nationhood to the political judgements that different actors are making about the European 
Union. 
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Introduction 
This paper approaches the interpretation of elite and popular attitudes towards the UK’s 
membership of the EU through an analysis of some of the rival perspectives on the national 
identity of the English that have become increasingly salient during the last two decades. An 
evaluation of these outlooks highlights their role as sources of some of the most influential 
ideas about nationhood, governance and state now shaping public discourse on the UK’s 
membership of the European Union.  The paper also seeks to erect a bridge between two 
conventionally separated debates – that focused upon the shift towards a more pronounced 
Euroscepticism, at both popular and elite levels, and that directed at the complex question of 
how and why the English have gradually returned to a more Anglo-centric, rather than 
Anglo-British, sense of identity. This latter theme has been the subject of considerable 
academic enquiry (for instance Aughey 2007; Kumar 2003), yet this has been conducted at 
some remove from the growing focus upon the sources and traditions pertinent to 
Euroscepticism (for an exception see Wellings 2012). A key contention here is that the 
emerging perspectives to which I draw attention have spawned webs of belief which connect 
new and old ideas of nationhood to the political judgements that different actors are making 
about the European Union. 
The crystallisation of several politically resonant, historically informed perspectives upon 
Englishness can be shown to represent an important, overlooked resource upon which those 
making anti- and pro-European arguments have drawn in the last twenty years. And these 
outlooks have also contributed to a rising uncertainty about the viability and appeal of 
Britishness – the encompassing form of national identity which has been promoted by the 
British state since the eighteenth century (Colley 1996). A significant shift in the manner in 
which the English have come to see themselves as a people -- and an increasing propensity to 
define themselves in institutional and political, as well as cultural, terms -- is an important, 
overlooked factor in the shaping of English Euroscepticism. Recent polling suggests that this 
attitude is more extensive in England than in the other territories of the UK (YouGov/The Sun 
2013), and the renewal of Englishness is one possible explanation for this important 
difference.  
The framework employed here is what some political scientists term an ‘interpretive’ one 
(Finlayson 2007), with an analytical emphasis upon the webs of belief from which new forms 
of English identity have been crafted, as opposed to the conventional tendency to treat 
Englishness as a reflexive response to exogenous forces (for instance Marquand 2008), or as 
a local version of a universal shift towards the politics of identity in European societies 
(Castells 1996). Instead, I highlight how an emerging body of nationally rooted thinking 
came to influence the calculations and expectations of politicians and various public 
audiences, notably in relation to the two Unions – the UK and the EU -- to which England 
uneasily belongs. The competition these have engendered will help determine whether, for 
instance, Englishness is framed as an insular, parochial and conservative identity, or is 
developed as a more outward looking and liberal formation. And the terms of this 
contestation are integral to the politics of the national and European questions in UK political 
life. An interpretive sensibility also helps shed light upon the extended crisis of confidence 
apparent among the political elite from the early 1990s, which was brought about by a 
declining faith in the viability of pre-existing understandings of constitution, nation and 
territorial governance. 
A disparate and contested politics of English nationhood represents a distinctive, historically 
shaped response to the interlocking sets of pressures and crises which have also been felt in 
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many  democratic states in the last thirty years, and are often linked to the development of a 
more globalised economy and the transition to post-industrial society. A turn towards a more 
entrenched and insular sense of nationhood among national and ethnic majorities has 
happened across Europe since 2000 (Kaufmann 2004). But the ideational focus which is 
explored here brings to the surface some of the specificities of the English context, not least 
the continuing impact of the abandonment of Empire and the specific challenges arising from 
the loss of faith – at elite and popular levels – in the viability and cohesion of the UK as a 
union state.  
Much academic debate on this topic, however, proceeds from the assumption that the 
introduction of devolution to Scotland and Wales by the Labour government in 1999 was the 
trigger for a delayed, but inevitable, backlash among the English (Kumar 2003; and, for 
scepticism on this score, Curtice 2009). Yet, this kind of causal proposition is challenged by 
research highlighting the range of meanings associated with a renewed sense of Englishness, 
not all of which relate to constitutional questions (Kenny  2014). The ingrained tendency of 
much political science to view nationhood as an identity that moves along a single dimension, 
and which can thus be measured in quantitative terms, neglects the consideration of how 
national ideas are employed by actors in different contexts (Mandler 2005). And, it thus 
occludes an appreciation of the cultural and political implications of different, competing 
constructions of nationhood, and their potential significance for shifting public attitudes 
towards European integration. Importantly, there is a growing recognition in intellectual and 
political circles that new patterns of national sentiment apparent among the English are 
integrally connected to the diffusion of Euroscepticism (Wellings 2012), and are shaped also 
by factors such as the impact of inward migration and the manifold changes to the UK’s 
political economy associated with its rapid transition to a post-industrial economy (Kenny  
2014). The notion of devolution as the causal trigger for an English backlash – which remains 
prevalent in parts of the political science literature -- fails to address these dimensions of the 
politics of Englishness. 
In the political world, however, there is an increasing fatalism among policy-makers and 
commentators about how the EU is perceived by the English public, with many believing that 
this populace is irredeemably opposed to the European project, in part because its 
technocratic character is impossible to legitimate in a context where populism and 
nationalism are so prevalent (Gifford 2008).  One of the assumptions informing such a belief 
is that Europhobia has strong roots in deep-rooted patterns of national sentiment which 
politicians are themselves unable to shape. But the passive manner in which the role of 
political actors is characterised in this kind of narrative is, I will suggest, belied by an 
analysis of the shifting patterns of thinking about nationhood in this period. This suggests, to 
the contrary, that political actors played a key, active role in licensing and stimulating the 
perception that established forms of Anglo-British nationhood were no longer viable or 
adequate.   
 
Crisis over Britain? - the 1990s  
This rising sense of fatalism should be seen in historical terms too -- as a product of a 
deepening uncertainty, which has been building for several decades against the backdrop of 
the abandonment of empire, recurrent anxieties since the late 1950s about the UK’s relative 
economic decline, and marked disagreements within elite circles about its geo-political future 
(Gamble 2003). The various ‘shocks’ administered during the Thatcher years to the 
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institutional order and ethos of the British state, and the economic dislocation occasioned by 
the rapid shift to a post-industrial economy in the 1980s and 1990s, also served to accentuate 
a gathering sense among influential intellectuals and opinion-formers that established forms 
of self-understanding – about the British state and its accompanying form of nationhood – 
Britishness -- were no longer adequate to the challenges facing the polity. While several of 
the exogenous factors which combined to generate a growing sense of uncertainty among the 
governing institutions and political parties were not unique to the UK, the tightly interwoven 
character of leading ideas about British nationhood, deeply embedded ideas about the 
constitution and its virtues, and a marked unease at elite level about the capacity of the 
English to accept the idea of pooled sovereignty or the granting of limited forms of self-
government to the Scots and Welsh, ensured that this sense of crisis was framed in highly 
particular ways in the UK context, as indeed it was in other European countries.  
It was during the early 1990s that increasingly divergent conceptions of the UK’s optimal 
relationship with the emerging system of European integration became particularly 
pronounced (Forster 2000), and these differences triggered broader debates about nationhood. 
One response to these was for progressively minded intellectuals to conflate a universalistic 
idea of a civic-liberal Britain with a celebration of the intrinsic merits of trans-national forms 
of identity and action. Leading figures such as Anthony Giddens (1998), the intellectual 
architect of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s much heralded ‘Third Way’, and Will Hutton (1995), 
author of one of the leading accounts of the way out of UK’s economic weaknesses, were 
influential disseminators of such thinking. Within this increasingly salient discourse, Europe 
was conceived as a hinge between a post-nationalist Britain and a progressively inclined 
version of globalisation. This became an influential and attractive frame for a wide range of 
thinkers on the liberal-left, including a number with links to the pro-European wing of the 
Labour party (Liddle and Mandelson 1996).  
There also arose at this time a markedly different, nationally conceived response to the 
dilemma represented by the European issue. This was fixated upon the quintessential 
differences between ‘the British tradition’ of statecraft and constitutional development, and 
the approach to governance and law-making associated with the leading powers of 
Continental Europe. While this was the minority view on the political right when the 
European question first arose in British politics, a belief in the fundamental incompatibility of 
these governing models became a matter of national and democratic conviction, attracting a 
growing number of thinkers, politicians, journalists and campaigners to the idea that core 
aspects of the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty were being jeopardised by the European 
project (Spiering 2004). 
The rising sense of uncertainty to which these divergent patterns of thinking were responses, 
led to a  widespread emphasis – apparent across the party political divide – upon the 
purported ‘crisis’ of established forms of state and nation during the 1990s. And this mood 
was expressed and accentuated by an extended period of soul-searching within the political 
and cultural worlds (Kenny2014). Different figures, from a variety of genres, contributed to 
this anxiety–fuelled conversation, which fed into a spate of popular television histories about 
the national past, innumerable journalistic commentaries, novels and non-fiction books, all 
dissecting the national predicament and identity confusion from which the English were often 
said to be suffering (see, among others, Paxman 1998; Marr 2009; Moreton 2011). It was 
from within this anxious discourse that politically resonant claims about national identity 
emerged and became prominent in a way that had not been seen in Britain’s public life since 
the exigent circumstances of the 1940s.  
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The notion that Britishness was a declining force at the popular level was a familiar theme in 
public discourse during the mid-1990s, but so too was the contrary contention -- that a 
revamped sense of Britishness could provide the unifying sense of identity and moral purpose 
required in an increasingly diverse and divided society (Goodhart 2004; Brown 2007). 
Political opinion subsequently became increasingly polarised around these two rival 
frameworks. On the one hand, Labour’s historic victory in 1997, and the incoming 
government’s support for globalisation and culturally metropolitan leanings, ensured the 
prevalence of those voices celebrating a nationhood that was identified with universalist 
liberal values, and which was designed in part to enable the UK to re-discover itself as an 
international actor. And, on the other, voices from the political right adopted an increasingly 
apocalyptic understanding of the implications of EU-wide integration during the 1990s, and 
bundled these together with fears about the consequences of some of the new government’s 
keynote reforms – including the introduction of the Human Rights Acts in 1998 and the 
provision of devolution in Scotland and Wales in 1999. Well-known pundit Peter Hitchens 
wrote a widely discussed book -- The Abolition of Britain (2000) — which chimed with the 
pessimism evoked in philosopher and campaigner Roger Scruton’s (2000) elegaic account of 
the disappearing English lineage. In these quarters New Labour’s determination to pass 
sovereignty downwards to political centres in territories outside England, and upwards to 
Brussels – projects that were congruent with increasingly fashionable theories about the 
demise of the nation-state in the era of globalisation – were viewed as irredeemably 
destructive of the Anglo-British nation. Out of this outlook there emerged an impulse to 
envisage radical measures in order to disrupt the federalist and devolutionist intentions of the 
Labour government. The idea of a referendum on Europe, which would herald either a major 
re-negotiation of the UK’s relationship or lead to outright withdrawal, emerged as an iconic 
expression of such sentiments. So did a discourse of complaint about the beleaguered position 
of the national heartland –  increasingly now depicted as England, not Britain – after 
devolution (Parris 2010; Aughey 2010), and a rhetorical tendency to separate the ‘core’ 
national territory from the kinds of entanglement, redistribution and territorial management 
associated with the United Kingdom. Englishness was therefore an integral thematic within a 
broader populist outlook, but it was also becoming the subject of other kinds of claim and 
characterisation in this period, and it is to three of the leading expressions of these that I now 
turn.  
 
Narratives of Englishness  
1) The Radical-Democratic Critique  
One of the most prominent and influential approaches to the question of the UK’s geo-
political future is associated with the work of leading Scottish nationalist and New Left 
intellectual Tom Nairn. The radical thesis which he first set out in the 1970s drew attention to 
the imminent and inexorable ‘break-up’ of Britain, and advanced an interpretation of English 
nationhood which stressed its stalled and pathological character (1977). This became a 
widely held orthodoxy in progressive circles. The emerging issue of European co-operation 
and the possibilities that might flow from such a development, were presented as a significant 
antidote to the stultifying conservatism of the English. Nairn’s argument did much to 
challenge the prevailing scepticism of the political left during the 1960s and 1970s about the 
prospect of Britain joining the Common Market. Indeed his thesis exerted a greater influence 
than any other single work (with the possible exception of historian Linda Colley’s Britons 
(1996) upon how progressives in the UK have thought about Englishness in the last fifty 
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years. Its core arguments, and Nairn’s subsequent analyses of the obfuscatory mystique 
fostered by the inner institutions of the British state, gradually coalesced to become a 
template for progressive thought (Nairn 2011).  
Nairn devoted considerable space to the emergence of an anti-European English nationalism 
orchestrated by the maverick Conservative politician Enoch Powell in the late 1960s (1977: 
256-90). The latter’s politics, notably his willingness to present immigration from the 
Commonwealth as a direct threat to the national interest, and his inveterate opposition to the 
Common Market (Powell 1971), were deemed to represent a ‘… comment on the absence of 
a normal nationalist sentiment, rather than an expression of nationalism’ (Nairn 1977: 78). 
Much was to hang -- here and elsewhere in his work -- on his use of the term ‘normal’ (see 
the critique advanced by Thompson 1965). It referenced an ideal-typical modern, egalitarian 
nationalism, and was the necessary preliminary, he believed, to the dissolution of the quasi-
feudal order which was a precondition for socialist advance in Britain. Powellism, while 
deploying the rhetoric and syntax of nationalism, offered something different altogether -- a 
further, morbid symptom of the continuing power of the ancien régime state to divert and 
suppress the national will of the English. The more the opportunity to express and inhabit a 
shared sense of popular nationhood was delayed, Nairn maintained, the more likely it was 
that resentment, grievance and racist sentiment would emerge instead (2000: 89).   
Nairn’s emphasis upon the close correlation between  regressive and chauvinistic expressions 
of Englishness and the Eurosceptic impulse has provided the template for the progressive 
judgment that English nationhood sustains an idea of a sovereignty that is indivisible, and  
cannot therefore permit the development of alternative sites of political authority beyond, or 
within, itself (for instance Marquand 2008) – a disposition which some also identify as a 
hangover from Empire. It is this property, it is often said, which renders the English unable to 
engage confidently with the kind of trans-national arrangements that are imperative in a 
world of multi-level governance (Colley 2013).  
For Nairn, the European project necessarily represented an elemental challenge to the Anglo-
British hegemony (1977). And, this idea became a major point of reference in the British 
left’s evolving thinking about the European issue,  and reinforced the tendency in these 
circles to dismiss Englishness as a formation defined by its insularity and narrowness. His 
argument was one of a number of influences presaging the wholesale shift of the Labour 
party, during the 1980s, towards an embrace of the European agenda as a terrain upon which 
a modern social democratic politics might be constructed – a change of heart that was rooted 
in the experience of many years of Conservative political domination after 1979.   
The imprint left by Nairn’s thought has been considerable, both among English progressives 
and Scottish nationalists. Leading figures in the Scottish National Party have continued to 
rely upon his twin assumptions that Anglo-nationalism tends to harbour regressive, anti-
liberal sentiments, and that the English can only regain a sense of their own national 
sovereignty following the dissolution of the UK state (Jackson 2013). One further aspect of 
Nairn’s analysis has also been transmitted more widely. This stems from his depiction of the 
‘void’ that supposedly lies at the heart of English national identity, the result of the blocked 
sense of aspiration associated with the delegation of sovereignty to Britain (this notion 
remains ubiquitous in the literature on Englishness; for instance Young 2007; Kumar 2003). 
Without a robust and democratic national ‘myth’, the English have returned again and again 
to a familiar stock of pastoral and aristocratic fantasies when called upon to depict their own 
imagined sense of national community. 
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Nairn’s arguments also boosted the increasingly favoured idea that the left needed to assist 
the construction of forms of community that spanned national borders in the era of 
globalisation, with the EU the most evident starting-point for such a ‘post-national’ project. 
Along with other major social democratic thinkers –including Will Hutton (1995), Tony Judt 
(2010) and David Marquand (2009) – Nairn yoked the longstanding tradition of radical-
democratic republicanism to the pro-European cause. Yet, this lineage was, in other 
manifestations, a decidedly patriotic one, and had been deployed by earlier radicals – for 
instance historian and campaigner E.P.Thompson and left-wing MP Tony Benn -- to critique 
the forerunners of the European Union (Osborn 2002). From the 1990s onwards, however, 
only a small number of voices on the left offered a sustained critique of the European project 
on national-democratic grounds (Newman 1996).  
Nairn’s thinking has, over the years, been subjected to some significant criticism, not least 
from those arguing during the 1990s that a progressive and democratically inclined 
Britishness could be redeemed from the carapace of conservative constitutionalism. In his 
critical response to Break-up, for instance, leading intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock 
insisted that Britain’s history should be conceived as ‘a pattern held together by its divisions 
and antagonisms’; and ‘British history … has been, and is, a game for a number of players, in 
which each player’s self-image, and image of the game, must be taken into account’ (2000: 
48).  Nairnite thinking occluded the very real possibility that the English might have good 
reasons to remain members of a political association that would preserve their established 
inter-relations with the Scots, Welsh and the Northern Irish.  
This critique reflected the kinds of sentiment that undergirded the attempt by senior Labour 
politicians, notably Chancellor of the Exchequer and then (from 2007) Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown, to promote a civic understanding of Britain as the progressive alternative to 
the ‘narrow’ nationalism that prevailed in the different constituent territories of the UK. But 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that not only was this project unsuccessful in the 
‘outer’ territories of the UK, but it was also ineffective and probably counter-productive in 
England too, with notable increases in the proportions of citizens identifying as English, not 
British, being reported in different polls during the 2000s (Wyn Jones et al., 2012). Indeed, 
different researchers, using various methodologies, concur that a significant further increase 
in levels of English identification took place around the time that Brown, an MP for a 
Scottish constituency, was anointed Prime Minister in 2007 (Kenny 2014; Skey 2008). 
In these same years, however, English nationhood was claimed by a number of distinct, rival 
cultural-cum-political narratives, and yet few left-of-centre politicians or thinkers sought to 
address Englishness in positive terms (for a notable exception see Blunkett 2005). The 
multiplicity of competing claims upon Englishness is overlooked in most political discourse 
or academic scholarship, even though different ideas of England have been marshalled in 
support of a range of different political and democratic arguments. 
 
(2) Restoring England 
The second perspective to which I draw attention also took its bearings from the dilemma 
generated by the perceived crisis of British identity, but articulated an entirely different 
response to it. As Britishness was becoming fatally weakened, it was suggested, European 
integration represented a potent threat to the interests and cultural traditions of the national 
heartland which liberal-minded politicians were disinclined or unable to protect. The 
territorial core of the nation was now increasingly frequently labelled England, not Britain or 
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the UK, and Englishness itself was presented in some conservative quarters as an older and 
more durable lineage than the national and constitutional orthodoxies associated with the 
British state. English nationhood was a patrimonial lineage, not a newly created identity, or 
modern form of nationalism, and could only be grasped through engagement with the 
unbroken ways of living and feeling, sentiments that came from contact with a select band of 
traditions, customs and places (Wright 2009). The countryside played an especially important 
role in this idiom, often depicted as a venue where the sense-experience of Englishness could 
be developed, and as a tenuous refuge from a variety of threats associated with modern life 
(Featherstone 2010).  This form of nostalgic Englishness was framed in the late 1990s as a 
meaningful site of political resistance to the metropolitan Labour government by activists 
from the Countryside Alliance, an umbrella organisation that campaigned against reforms 
such as the ban introduced upon the hunting of foxes (in 2004), and objected more generally 
to the perceived neglect of rural interests and institutions.  
This sensibility prompted a new melding of conservative and radical ideas (Aughey 2006), 
typically evoking a powerful sense of nostalgia for a formerly great nation that was once 
more in peril. Its signature contention -- that an unchanging English spirit was being re-born 
in the present, casting off the different masks it has worn since the establishment of Britain -- 
has sustained a powerful and resonant seam of thinking in public discourse, and had a major 
impact upon debates about Europe – framing the latter as the preference of political elites that 
were slavishly devoted to the kinds of economic and social liberalism favoured by business 
elites and endemically hostile to the organic, national culture of the English people. 
One of the leading intellectual architects of this restorative approach to Englishness was 
philosopher and campaigner Roger Scruton (2000). He emerged as a prominent opponent of 
the New Labour governments, becoming a leading campaigner against the legislation banning 
hunting with dogs (2002). Scruton located his opposition to the metropolitan liberalism which 
he saw as the underpinning of the New Labour governments in a wider lament about the 
imminent demise of institutional and cultural aspects of the English tradition. He declared 
that ‘… things had moved on so much that the whole concept of Britain had been thrown into 
disarray. It had become quite apparent that there is no such cultural entity any more’ (2000: 
30).  In response, he turned his attention to the ideals, institutions and landscapes that had 
prompted an Englishness which was now on the verge of extinction.1 In the Burkean compact 
between the living, the dead and the unborn, he intoned, trust is placed in our collective 
inheritance, particularly in the form of those organisations, practices and traditions that had 
emerged out of the customs and cultures of the English past. A sense of place and territorial 
loyalty, he argued, were central to the inner core of this people (2000). And while a good deal 
of this account of England’s law, customs and ways of life borrowed heartily from the 
tradition of Edwardian ruralism – which one important recent account identifies as the key 
source for modern English nationalism (Kumar 2003) -- his argument also contained some 
decidedly new elements, and these were prescient of the shifting patterns of conservative 
sentiment in this period. He supplied a redoubtable critique of the contempt shown by the 
liberal political elite for the heritage of England.  This -- for him and other conservatives -- 
was vividly illustrated by the government’s apparent compliance with the intention of the 
European Commission to promote a ‘Europe of the regions’, a project which was widely 
viewed as representing the potential erosion of England as a sovereign territory (Daily Mail 
2008). A plethora of directives and regulations flowing from Brussels in subsequent years 
                                                             
1 Scruton was commissioned in the early 1990s to write a book about Britain. But by the time he came to write it, 
roughly a decade later, it felt unimaginable that he could or should now refer to Britain, as opposed to England; 
interview with X and X, 25 June 2008 (transcript available from the author). 
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were repeatedly presented as antithetical to the beleaguered traditions of the national majority 
(Gifford 2008).  Accordingly, in the context of the perceived threat to national sovereignty 
posed by Europe, and following Labour’s devolutionary policies -- which appeared to many 
as a reckless break with the conventions and statecraft that underpinned the UK -- many on 
the political right were inexorably drawn towards radical constitutional positions. An 
increasing number of conservatives began to favour the introduction of an English parliament 
(Wyn Jones et al. 2013) either as a bulwark against a devolution settlement that appeared to 
favour the non-English territories or, for some, as a route towards the dissolution of the UK 
and a retreat to the English heartland. It was in these circles too that the idea of holding a 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union became iconic (Gifford 2008). 
But the familiar seam of Tory Englishness that Scruton mined, and his reworking of the 
traditionalism associated with philosopher Michael Oakeshott in particular, was leavened 
with novel elements – angry, populist notes about Europe, greater inward migration and the 
alleged suppression of English traditional culture. Scruton’s polemical characterisation of an 
England at the mercy of the interlocking processes of globalisation, immigration and 
Europeanisation, and increasingly unprotected by its political and economic leaders, spoke to, 
and helped order, an important shift in parts of the public mood during this period, signalling 
the emergence of a populist mind-set which was increasingly opposed to the constitutional 
settlement which Toryism had helped foster and defend.  
The sudden rise to prominence, after 2010, of a new right-populist challenger party (the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)), and its significant breakthrough at the county 
and local elections of 2013 (it received 26% of all votes cast in England), also signalled the 
growing popularity of this new instantiation of Englishness. Increasingly, the English and 
their heritage were framed as an endangered and embattled grouping, derided by a political 
establishment which was ideologically inclined to use the state on behalf of other ethnic and 
national minorities, rather than the indigenous English (Ashcroft 2012). This populist-
nationalist perspective, which was widely evoked by a number of tabloid newspapers, Tory 
MPs and media pundits, was catalysed into an increasingly resonant mixture of nostalgia and 
resentment by UKIP, as it evolved from being a party obsessively focused upon the European 
issue, into a more flexible, ‘catch-all’ right-populist force, modelling itself on similar parties 
elsewhere in Europe and drawing upon indigenous nationalist thinking (Tournier-Sol 2014). 
More generally, the restorative ambition of re-kindling the unbroken, but endangered, English 
pathway did not just speak to Conservatives and right-populists. It also became an appealing 
trope for writers and campaigners across the ideological spectrum (for instance Moreton 
2010). This mood of English revivalism led some radical minds towards a more 
conservatively inclined conviction that the progressive future lay in renewing the fusion of 
patriotism and radicalism that had been characteristic of earlier periods in the left’s history 
(Cruddas 2010). Anti-globalisation campaigner Paul Kingsnorth gained considerable 
attention for his populist contention that the political left also needed to reclaim an authentic 
England that has latterly been betrayed by the country’s economic and political rulers (2009). 
Taking his readers on a journey in search of the ‘real England’ that was on the point of 
vanishing, he offered a repeated, emphatic contrast between Anglo-cultural artefacts and 
practices -- including traditional farming, rural pubs and small shops -- and the forces of 
progress determined to obliterate them in the name of profit and consumer choice. This 
nostalgic re-imagining of a disappearing English heritage received extensive coverage in the 
media and blogosphere.2  While his ire was mostly directed at home-grown bureaucrats, 
                                                             
2 A number of reviews are collected at: http://www.paulkingsnorth.net/books/real-england/re-reviews.  
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politicians and planners, Kingsnorth’s book was also peppered with negative references to the 
impact of European regulations and laws upon indigenous traditional customs and practices. 
The wide interest in his book illustrated the growing resonance of arguments pitched in 
relation to a reclaimed English heritage.  Most strikingly of all, the author endorsed an 
assertive kind of political nationalism, a sensibility that he acknowledged was a heterodox 
one in progressive circles. England, he declared, ‘… is a nation, Britain is a convenience’ 
(2009: 17). 
In these different political incarnations, the argument for the restoration of an unbroken 
English lineage revived the ingrained habit of conceiving Englishness in strongly 
exceptionalist terms, with particular emphasis given to the unique properties of place, 
landscape and topography, and their implications for English character and culture (Bunting 
2008). Some commentators have argued that the roots of this discourse lay in the 
renunciation of empire and the weakening hold of the idea of a pan-national Britishness in the 
twentieth century, developments which led intellectuals and politicians from the 1950s 
onwards to re-imagine the national heartland in shrunken, Anglo-centric terms (Esty 2003). 
The highly particularistic vein in which Englishness has increasingly been invoked in 
political circles has underscored its presumed incompatibility with the universalistic qualities 
embodied in the model of civic Britain and the rights encoded within the EU’s constitution 
and laws. 
And yet, these forms of particularism have merely veiled the re-circulation of some resonant 
propositions about the English that are deeply universalist in implication. It was the English, 
Scruton declared, who had given the ideal of ordered liberty to other European nations (2000). 
And more generally, the appeal to the English heartland was frequently premised upon the 
conviction that England had pioneered a pathway to modernity – an argument that was at the 
heart of Liah Greenfeld’s much debated characterisation of the history of English nationhood 
(1993) -- and which chimed with a re-emergent celebration of the Anglosphere in some 
circles in these years. The deep preference for the free market and small state favoured by 
proponents of this national vision were typically presented as fundamentally antithetical and 
institutionally superior to the kinds of Napoleonic statism associated with Brussels (Redwood 
1999). 
 
3) Anglo-Britain – an on-going dialogue 
The third, nationally-focused perspective to which I draw attention reflects the renewal of the 
assumptions and values associated with the governing wisdom still embedded within the 
practices and institutions at the heart of the UK’s political system. It stemmed too from a 
body of academic scholarship devoted to re-assessing the political thinking associated with 
leading expressions of the British national and constitutional traditions (for instance Aughey 
2006; Mandler 2006; Stapleton 2004). Of late there has been a revival of liberal-conservative 
constitutionalism in both of these milieux. But, whereas for several centuries this represented 
the unwritten ethos of the constitution, this is now a perspective that feels itself under 
considerable threat and has to fight for its place within the market-place of national ideas. It 
has its roots in the whiggish liberalism that infused the thinking of the political elite during 
the nineteenth century and coheres around the conviction that the British tradition continues 
to offer a supple and broadly liberal framework with which the English are, by and large, 
happy to identify. The revival of this perspective was demonstrated by the work of leading 
historian of ideas and constitutional commentator, Arthur Aughey (2007; Aughey and 
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Berberich 2012), who deployed Oakeshottian motifs for very different ends to those pursued 
by Scruton.  
The perspective exemplified by Aughey seeks to avoid the more strident forms of 
universalism and particularism that are typical of the restorationist and radical-democratic 
paradigms. The influence of this impulse can be identified too in the political science field, 
where a number of experts (most notably academic and member of the House of Lords Philip 
Norton (2013)), have continued to propound the virtues of the established parliamentary 
system against various proposed schemes for reform. This pragmatist school of commentary 
often invokes many of the assumed virtues of the liberal-constitutionalist tradition, and has 
supplied a counter-point to the claim of many progressives and conservatives that the 
achievement of a more secure and stable sense of English nationhood is contingent upon the 
re-organisation of the constitutional and political structures of the British state. It also, 
importantly, reflects many of the underpinning assumptions to which political practitioners 
and civil servants still cleave. 
Aughey has provided perhaps the most comprehensive and evocative contemporary 
expression of this diverse lineage (2006), charting the importance of a supple and interwoven 
body of ideas about nationhood, parliamentary sovereignty and English culture, which he 
characterised – following Oakeshott -- as the governing tradition of the polity (Oakeshott 
1962). On this view it was continuity, adaptability and evolution that have been the hallmarks 
of the constitution, and these have been buttressed by the stable and non-nationalist character 
of English self-understanding. In a recent essay he pursued the conversational metaphor 
derived from Oakeshott in more depth (Aughey and Berberich 2012). Englishness ought to be 
understood not as a tradition with a fixed essence, but as: ‘… a national conversation, an 
imaginative rather than a purely functional engagement, about the country’s history, culture 
and society, where what is being conversed about is the meaning of England itself’ (2012: 2). 
This is a dialogue that takes its bearings from, and is made possible by, the established 
tradition that precedes it, and which, by definition, ‘… involves a plural notion of these 
Englands rather than the singular notion of this England ....’ (2012: 2). The Oakeshottian 
understanding of tradition as an ensemble made up of many contingent elements, and not 
dependent upon a single rationale, is commended both as a methodological approach to the 
appreciation of nationhood and as an embodiment of the main attributes of Britishness itself.  
Aughey employed it to underscore his account of the national paradigm as a multi-vocal 
entity, which is not anchored by any one claim or practice.  
This account faces the growing difficulty that many of the English are increasingly unlikely 
to relate to their own sense of nationhood in this way, and appear disinclined to develop this 
kind of disposition. Political and cultural claims made in relation to English identity are 
increasingly characterised by their loud, partisan and vernacular qualities, as various recent 
sociological studies make clear (Skey 2012; Mann 2011; Mann and Fenton 2009; Garner 
2012). And in this populist idiom, Englishness is often advanced as an endangered species, in 
need of defending from a (British) state that tends to favour minority groups and the smaller 
nationalities of the UK, and is in thrall to the bureaucratic imperatives associated with the 
European Union.  
Equally, this paradigm is under considerable strain as a result of the markedly divergent 
views of the UK’s role in, and relationship with, the EU that are favoured by its advocates. 
For a shrinking, but still significant, pool of political actors and commentators, the British 
tradition can be pragmatically reconciled with membership of this larger Union, on the 
condition that the terms of European membership do not impinge upon fundamental aspects 
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of national sovereignty – a principle that has been the subject of increasingly vigorous 
contestation in policy terms. And yet, for others on the political right, there is a fundamental 
antithesis between the British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty and the customary nature 
of its legal tradition, and the forms of governance associated with the Commission and 
European Parliament (Crowson 2006), and this antinomy renders England’s participation 
within this venture inherently problematic.  
Appeals to ‘the British tradition’ – for so long a fixture within established forms of 
constitutional argument -- have therefore ceased to provide a source of unambiguous wisdom 
for political practitioners. And this development reflects a growing sense of uncertainty about 
the continuing viability of the British national story to which its constitutional tradition is tied. 
The notion of the UK as an exemplar of the principle of ‘civil association’ (in Oakeshottian 
(2000) parlance) makes it increasingly inapplicable to a context in which both state and union 
are overwhelmingly cast in the terms which he associated with ‘enterprise associations’ -- as 
the English are ever more prone to pose in instrumental terms the question of what it is that 
they get from the two unions to which they belong. More generally, the ideal of the civilised, 
national dialogue that has prevailed in such venues as Westminster and Whitehall, now 
speaks to a significantly smaller pool of citizens than was the case twenty years ago. It 
requires a quite considerable leap of faith to assume that the British tradition, and the kind of 
political conversation it embodies, retains the capacity to underpin a stable territorial and 
state system in the UK.  
Political insiders, leading commentators and liberal intellectuals who still abide by the terms 
of this deeply rooted paradigm retain the hope that the wisdom accumulated within the 
British model of statecraft might yet point towards a way of re-organising the furniture of 
government and representation in a way that would head off English disaffection, as well as 
nationalist currents elsewhere. And yet, all around them Englishness is becoming a much 
more prominent point of reference, in political as well as cultural terms, a development that 
renders the prevailing idea of the English as a people who readily identify with the unionist 
tradition an increasingly fraught one. 
 
Conclusions 
The three broad, internally differentiated perspectives sketched here have each tried to 
establish a stranglehold on the public understanding of the character and implications of the 
renewal of an avowedly English form of nationhood. Each also carries significant 
implications for the way in which this sense of nationality is calibrated in political terms in 
relation to the British state, the domestic union and the EU. Together, they have shaped some 
of the main arguments about nationhood and governance in the increasingly contested Anglo-
British case. And each has prompted and responded to the growing prevalence of England as 
‘an imagined community’ (Anderson 1991), a trend which has rendered other circles of 
attachment – to the UK and Europe – more tenuous and distant.  
But while conventional wisdom tends to maintain that the renewal of a sense of English 
identity is an insuperable blockage to the project of legitimising the EU, the analysis offered 
here points towards a different conclusion -- that political analysts need a more sophisticated 
appreciation of the different, contending constructions of nationhood that have become 
prominent in the recent period, and the various political ends to which these are put. The 
interpretive sensibility upon which I have called draws attention to the contingent, not 
inherent, character of the opposition between English nationhood and wider circles of 
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national association and engagement. Importantly, there have emerged powerful and resonant 
versions of Englishness which are in direct competition with the more nativist and populist 
idiom that has become prominent of late, and the contestation between these expressions may 
well be a major factor in determining whether an English sense of nationality might be 
reconfigured as a form of identification that will ‘nest’ within wider multi-national unions 
and alliances. 
Equally, some of the beliefs that arise from these frameworks have become important causal 
influences upon the calculations of political actors and commentators, and are worthy of more 
serious political analysis for this reason alone. Thus, characterisations of  English national 
identity as exceptionally insular and inherently parochial have featured in the reflections and 
calculations of numerous politicians and policy-makers in recent years. UKIP, for instance, is 
widely viewed as successful because of its ability to relate to a more salient sense of English 
disenchantment, and the latter is typically presumed to constitute a seedbed of anti-European 
sentiment (Ashcroft 2012). This perception was one of the factors informing the UK Prime 
Minister’s decision in early 2012 to call for a referendum on European membership in a 
future government should he not succeed in re-negotiating its relationship with the EU. 
The bulk of Labour’s parliamentary leadership, meanwhile, remains convinced that it can or 
should say little about a shift in Anglo-consciousness which, pace Nairn, many in its ranks 
believe is conducive to a conservative or populist, disposition. The party remains 
predominantly hostile to any reform that might offer the English a greater degree of political 
and institutional recognition (including the very mild proposals for reform to the way in 
which the House of Commons handles legislation that affects England only, that were 
outlined in the independent McKay Commission in March 2013)3, in part because many 
progressives believe that England would be highly unlikely to elect a Labour government 
(despite Labour’s performances in the general elections of 1997 and 2001). The continuing 
influence of this fear can be traced back, in part, to the perspectives outlined above. 
Progressives and conservatives alike are increasingly convinced that the re-animation of 
Englishness necessarily means a rejection of the kinds of trans-national involvement and co-
operation which the liberal ideal of Britishness was intended to legitimise. Yet, the analysis 
pursued here suggests -- to the contrary -- that such an assumption reflects the kind of fixed, 
essentialist characterisation of Englishness which is challenged by a recognition of the 
contingently formed, narrative perspectives which have been drawn towards it. English 
nationhood is far more fluid, divided and open to contestation than any of these competing 
outlooks, and much current political judgment, tend to admit.   
A critical focus upon these developing debates about English nationhood, therefore, brings 
some important insights to the political analysis of perceptions of the European project within 
the UK. It suggests, above all, that the level of hostility to the EU which distinguishes 
England from other national groupings in the UK has its roots in patterns of national 
discourse as well as other sources of disillusion, such as the Eurozone crisis. And, it 
highlights the important role that ideological frameworks and narratives have played in 
shaping and ordering public sentiments on the interlocking issues of nationhood, constitution 
and governance in UK politics. Whereas conventional wisdom has it that the intertwined 
forces of nationalism and populism are inexorably undermining the legitimacy of the 
European enterprise across many of its member states, the analysis pursued here suggests that 
                                                             
3 Details of the McKay Commission can be found at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403030652/http://tmc.independent.gov.uk/. Labour declined to 
make a submission to it, or respond publicly to its final report. 
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political analysts would do well to pay greater heed to the ideas, expectations and stories that 
have been propounded by politicians and intellectuals ‘from above’, and consider their 
impact upon, and relationship with, shifting patterns of national sentiment in society at large. 
More generally, it implies that the political analysis of Euroscepticism ought to pay greater 
heed to the deep roots and pre-existing traditions of national thinking upon which newer 
populist currents are able to call.  
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